When I took up law, I learned that I have so much to learn. The advantage of being a law student does not lie on the assumption that you are better than the others, knowing a little of something that others do not just boosts up your morale.
No matter where you are, you would agree that you will see children and families begging for money, for something to eat, for mercy. The fourth day of my perspective series is about charity. I will try to avoid sounding legalese but a discussion of some legal terms is necessary to express my idea thoroughly.
Presidential Decree No. 1563 is the law intended to control and eradicate mendicancy because it is declared that mendicancy breeds crime, creates traffic hazards, endangers health, and exposes mendicants to indignities and degradation. Section 3(a) of the law defines a mendicant as any person, except those enumerated in Section 4 of this Decree, who has no visible and legal means of support, or lawful employment and who is physically able to work but neglects to apply himself to some lawful calling and instead uses begging as a means of living.
It is not enough to know who and what a mendicant is but more importantly it is imperative to take note that the law provides for criminal liability against the mendicant, the parents of exploited minors and of course the persons who give alms to the mendicants. Yes, you heard it right; giving alms to mendicants is a violation of this law. I will quote the last paragraph of Section 5 of the law “Any person who abets mendicancy by giving alms directly to mendicants, exploited infants and minors on public roads, sidewalks, parks and bridges shall be punished by a fine not exceeding P20.00.”
Despite the seemingly obsolescent penalty of P20.00, the fact remains that supporting mendicancy by giving alms is punishable. Thus, when I went to C&E publishing to get the books which I reserved, I pitied the children draped with almost nothing while soaked in the rain. I was torn between obeying the law and exercising acts of charity.
Good thing was one of the children offered to get me a taxi, which I instantly appreciated. When I was seated comfortably, I reached inside my pocket and gave her some coins. She said “salamat kuya”, then the taxi went off. I felt satisfied for when I pondered, I concluded that the child was not a mendicant because at the time I gave her some coin, it was in payment for the service that she performed. Facio ut des. Charity without violating any law.
Adsum
12.17.2011
12:13 pm
Saturday, December 17, 2011
Perspective: Day 3 (Impression) 12.16.2011
If given a chance to change one of my characters, I will willingly let go my being an “impressionist”. By being an impressionist I meant having a negative first impression against someone which I tend to carry against or in favor of that person for forever, so that whatever that person says or does will be construed by my pity self negatively.
I understand we all feel the same way at some point. Let us take this arrogant man whom I heard ignites fire. We haven’t even talked but because of what I heard and what he did to my friend, I started to dislike this person. I never even imagined being with his company. Another person is the charlatan, the know-it-all kind of man. I can not explain but since day one, his aura reverberated pomp which I cannot take. There is also this kid which voice I did not like so that every time he utters a word, I suffer from internal turmoil which myself created. The bossy lady who imposes all her ideas without considering the opinion of others also comes within the list and so on and so forth.
At first I tried to justify such reaction by believing that it is rational, by believing that my impressions are true and by believing that I can not change my impression because it’s my natural human reflex. However, after giving myself a chance to reach out and know the people I hated, I realized that being so much of an impressionist has burdened me.
By some twist of fate, I was able to talk with one of the victims of my impression. As the conversation progressed, I admitted to myself, maybe I was wrong all along. I came to ponder on the fact that people were created differently so that there is a natural tendency for people to treat and react to others differently. A person’s treatment to my friends may differ when it come to me and vice versa. It all boils down to sensitivity and responding to the people around you.
Today I learned to let go of associating an impression to a particular person. I learned to be selfless by considering what the others feel instead of thinking what you feel towards others. I learned to stop expecting a particular response to your deeds because when the response you receive is not commensurate to your expectation frustration fills in. When frustrated, you forget to appreciate the wonders offered by your environment. Instead you become trapped inside a world of frustration that you yourself created.
Today I will have a new perspective. Today I will let go of the monster in me.
Adsum
12.17.2011
10:47 am
I understand we all feel the same way at some point. Let us take this arrogant man whom I heard ignites fire. We haven’t even talked but because of what I heard and what he did to my friend, I started to dislike this person. I never even imagined being with his company. Another person is the charlatan, the know-it-all kind of man. I can not explain but since day one, his aura reverberated pomp which I cannot take. There is also this kid which voice I did not like so that every time he utters a word, I suffer from internal turmoil which myself created. The bossy lady who imposes all her ideas without considering the opinion of others also comes within the list and so on and so forth.
At first I tried to justify such reaction by believing that it is rational, by believing that my impressions are true and by believing that I can not change my impression because it’s my natural human reflex. However, after giving myself a chance to reach out and know the people I hated, I realized that being so much of an impressionist has burdened me.
By some twist of fate, I was able to talk with one of the victims of my impression. As the conversation progressed, I admitted to myself, maybe I was wrong all along. I came to ponder on the fact that people were created differently so that there is a natural tendency for people to treat and react to others differently. A person’s treatment to my friends may differ when it come to me and vice versa. It all boils down to sensitivity and responding to the people around you.
Today I learned to let go of associating an impression to a particular person. I learned to be selfless by considering what the others feel instead of thinking what you feel towards others. I learned to stop expecting a particular response to your deeds because when the response you receive is not commensurate to your expectation frustration fills in. When frustrated, you forget to appreciate the wonders offered by your environment. Instead you become trapped inside a world of frustration that you yourself created.
Today I will have a new perspective. Today I will let go of the monster in me.
Adsum
12.17.2011
10:47 am
Perspective: Day 2 (Faith) 12.15.2011
I do not want to consider this as another jeepney story though it all happened in a jeep. Last Thursday, I was to attend an exclusive Christmas party but due to the painstaking and laborious labor law review exam and recitation and the fact that I did not have the fund yet I was not able to buy a gift for my Manito in advance. Actually I did not worry because he was leaving for Leyte, so I said maybe I can give it next year. By good riddance our class ended early to give way for the scheduled class Christmas party (which by the way, I did not attend). Upon knowing of SM’s extended mall hours, I immediately proceeded there without even thinking of what to buy. It was 6:30 pm, while on the jeep, I prayed to God that he deliver me safely and on time. I also asked Him for a minute so I will be able to hand my gift to my Manito.
After my swift shopping, my primary concern was to get to the venue on time. The taxi line was so long, so I decided to take a jeep and then taxi after. I was seated near the driver and for the whole duration of the ride, I was just praying for a minute—a minute so that I will be able to hand my gift before my Manito leaves.
I repeated the same mantra all through out, I claimed it in God’s name and entrusted everything to Him. I gave all the impatience to him. At that point, I was tested—my faith was tested.
When I arrived at the venue, to my awe and amazement, my Manito was there because the ship was not allowed voyage due to the impending threat of typhoon Sendong. Indeed, God works in mysterious ways. I asked for a minute, He gave me hours. I asked for support, He gave me unconditional help. I asked for favor, He flooded me with assistance.
Today I learned the true meaning of faith. We should change our perspective towards entrusting everything, especially the impossible to Him. Today and the days onward, I will shout, proclaim and claim that all will be possible if we ask and be humble enough to recognize that there is someone Supreme willing and ready to lend His hand.
Adsum
12.17.2011
8:54 am
After my swift shopping, my primary concern was to get to the venue on time. The taxi line was so long, so I decided to take a jeep and then taxi after. I was seated near the driver and for the whole duration of the ride, I was just praying for a minute—a minute so that I will be able to hand my gift before my Manito leaves.
I repeated the same mantra all through out, I claimed it in God’s name and entrusted everything to Him. I gave all the impatience to him. At that point, I was tested—my faith was tested.
When I arrived at the venue, to my awe and amazement, my Manito was there because the ship was not allowed voyage due to the impending threat of typhoon Sendong. Indeed, God works in mysterious ways. I asked for a minute, He gave me hours. I asked for support, He gave me unconditional help. I asked for favor, He flooded me with assistance.
Today I learned the true meaning of faith. We should change our perspective towards entrusting everything, especially the impossible to Him. Today and the days onward, I will shout, proclaim and claim that all will be possible if we ask and be humble enough to recognize that there is someone Supreme willing and ready to lend His hand.
Adsum
12.17.2011
8:54 am
Thursday, December 15, 2011
Perspective: Day 1 (Positivity) 12.14.2011
In a jeepney, why do people hate to sit behind or at the seat nearest to the driver? Various plausible answers are available. One, a person want to save time and distance (not to mention, the hassle in passing through legs and baggage of other passengers) in alighting. Two, some feel comfortable to sit in the rear end to save themselves from the discomfort of claustrophobia. Third, people would not want to serve as the “collector”—the medium through which the fare pass from the passenger to the driver and from the driver to the passenger.
The third reason is understandable because some of our co-passengers are insensitive to the feelings of others. Some forget to use words of request, instead brandish a tone order sans humility. Still some are just born proud that a simple request for help is construed as a humungous sacrifice.
In my quest for self development and transformation, I challenged myself to change my perspective—love what I hate, understand the enigmatic, smile when I am desperate. It has been an open secret that the true key to success lies in one’s attitude towards the events confronting him. So that, sitting behind or near the driver should be viewed in a positive way. Instead of avoiding that seat, grab it and fight for that little space because by occupying that part of the jeep you are rendering service to your fellow men. I made a resolution that instead of boggling my mind about the smirk of the people whom you pass on your fare or the yell of the people passing to you their fare, let it pass and think of the great favor you are giving them and the contribution who give to the social group you are in.
At the end of the day, you will realize how lucky you are because you are able to experience riding a jeep, seeing people around you while communicating with them. You should also learn to appreciate the simple things you see and the people you interact because these are the blessings scattered around which remain unnoticed. If you view things in that perspective, you will not be mindful of the scorching heat, or the settling dust, of the deafening noise, or the long wait. Most importantly, every time you step down that jeep, you will realize that instead of losing a part of you, the fact is you gained more—more fulfillment and altruism.
Adsum
12.15.2011
4:34 pm
The third reason is understandable because some of our co-passengers are insensitive to the feelings of others. Some forget to use words of request, instead brandish a tone order sans humility. Still some are just born proud that a simple request for help is construed as a humungous sacrifice.
In my quest for self development and transformation, I challenged myself to change my perspective—love what I hate, understand the enigmatic, smile when I am desperate. It has been an open secret that the true key to success lies in one’s attitude towards the events confronting him. So that, sitting behind or near the driver should be viewed in a positive way. Instead of avoiding that seat, grab it and fight for that little space because by occupying that part of the jeep you are rendering service to your fellow men. I made a resolution that instead of boggling my mind about the smirk of the people whom you pass on your fare or the yell of the people passing to you their fare, let it pass and think of the great favor you are giving them and the contribution who give to the social group you are in.
At the end of the day, you will realize how lucky you are because you are able to experience riding a jeep, seeing people around you while communicating with them. You should also learn to appreciate the simple things you see and the people you interact because these are the blessings scattered around which remain unnoticed. If you view things in that perspective, you will not be mindful of the scorching heat, or the settling dust, of the deafening noise, or the long wait. Most importantly, every time you step down that jeep, you will realize that instead of losing a part of you, the fact is you gained more—more fulfillment and altruism.
Adsum
12.15.2011
4:34 pm
Thursday, October 6, 2011
Russel Pernites has invited you to Boxbe
This message was sent at the request of russelsithli@gmail.com. If you would like to opt-out of Boxbe invitations, click here.
Boxbe, Inc. | 2390 Chestnut Street #201 | San Francisco, CA 94123
Monday, October 3, 2011
Russel Pernites invites you to use Boxbe
I'd like to invite you to join Boxbe.
-Russel
Here's the link:
https://www.boxbe.com/register?tc=9713698842_1447742472
This message was sent at the request of russelsithli@gmail.com. If you would like to opt-out of Boxbe invitations, click here.
Boxbe, Inc. | 2390 Chestnut Street #201 | San Francisco, CA 94123
Friday, July 22, 2011
Kabalintunaan
Di ko alam, di ko maintindihan.
Noon akin ka, akin ka ng buo.
Di ko naman ginustong malayo ka
Pero piabayaan lang kita.
Tumahimik ang lahat
Pero hindi ang aking puso at isipan
Sa tuwing ikaw ay natatanaw
Mga nakaw na sulyap laging binibitaw.
Ngayong ako ay may lakas na ng loob
Na lapitan at kausapin ka
Bumabalik ang malakas na pintig
Kaba, tuwa tuwing kausap ka.
Hindi ko maintindihan
Ano ‘tong nararamdaman
Ayokong maging mang aagaw
Hindi kita kayang saktan.
Akin ka noon
Anong nangyari ngayon?
Ako ay nakikihati, nakikibahagi
Sa iyo kapag wala siya.
Masaya talaga
Pero alam kong hindi tama
Pagsisisi lang ang tanging magagawa
Ginawa ko ba ay tama?
Tuesday, July 12, 2011
Meaning of Beneficial Ownership [G.R. No. 127882. December 1, 2004.] LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. Victor Ramos, DENR Secretary
Beneficial Ownership
Beneficial ownership, as the plain meaning of the words implies, refers to the right to the gains, rewards and advantages generated by the property.
The concept is not new, but in fact is well entrenched in the law of trusts. Thus, while the trustee holds the legal title to or ownership of the property entrusted to him, he is nevertheless not the beneficial owner. Rather, he holds and administers the property for the benefit of another, called the beneficiary or the cestui que trust. Hence, the profits realized from the administration and management of the property by the trustee, who is the "naked owner," less any lawful fees due to the latter, accrue to the cestui que trust, who is the "beneficial" or "equitable" owner.
The foregoing concepts are directly applicable to the statement in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution that "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State."
The words "owned" and "State" should both be understood on two levels. "Owned" or "ownership" refers to both the legal title to and the beneficial ownership of the natural resources. Similarly, "State" should be understood as denoting both the body politic making up the Republic of the Philippines
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
Tuesday, June 14, 2011
Freedom
June 12 signifies the commemoration of our independence from the control and orders of some external forces. Although the first Philippine Republic was very short lived, it has left a legacy which we will cherish for as long as the world will exist.
Aside from the parade and other nationalistic activities and the holiday from work and school, independence day should be a reminder for us to measure whether or not we have truly achieved independence. Independence is not only limited to the absence of actual usurpation by a foreign power into our territorial jurisdiction but must also be viewed in relation to some indirect manner of controlling us, sometimes without our knowledge and sometimes with our consent. Independence must not also be limited to the collectivity but also individually. Independence must be holistic.
The neo imperialistic policies of other states have pervaded us to the extent of diffusing our own identity. Why are the youth so into Justin Bieber? Why do Filipinos prefer foreign products? Why are the names of Filipino babies foreign sounding? Why are the books we read and use in school authored by foreigners? These are some of the salient manifestations that we are not yet truly independent. When I say the latter statement, I have considered every other arguments so as not to sound hypocrite.
If we reconsider our forefathers' objective in seeking the independence of the Philippines from the Spaniards, the Japanese and the Americans, it would point out to one thing--IDENTITY! We wanted to assert our identity as Filipinos (or whatever we were called prior to that name). We wanted them to know that we can stand on our own, that we can govern our own affairs and that we can be at par with the others. The recent developments in the political, social and economic arena have ostensibly led us to give up some of our identity. The internet for instance is a melting pot of information--both good and bad. It is also the primary source of influence which slowly erodes our identity through the easy access to foreign materials which are labeled "better" than our own. The educational institutions which should be the principal molder of our children's nationalism sometimes are also the primary cause why they lose their identity. Nevertheless, it is recognize that the doctrine of auto-limitation is operative in our jurisdiction, thus, whenever we allow foreign powers or authorities or organizations to occupy some of our territories or exercise jurisdiction in some of our political, economic and social spheres, these acts are not necessarily void but are valid as long as they do not violate any provision of our laws and Constitution.
According to last Sunday's message, we can also never be truly independent if we do not have a Supreme Being to whom we can entrust everything which we deem impossible to do within our human capacity. To this end, independence really lies within us. If we individually develop our identity as Filipinos, as lovers of freedom and democracy and of our country, as protectors of our liberty and as a good citizen of the international community, no foreign influence no matter how strong will be able to change what we are. The individual perspective if brought in the collective arena will display our Filipino nation's insignia--we are brown, we are short, but we are brave, we are independent.
Adsum
June 14, 2011
10:44 am
Aside from the parade and other nationalistic activities and the holiday from work and school, independence day should be a reminder for us to measure whether or not we have truly achieved independence. Independence is not only limited to the absence of actual usurpation by a foreign power into our territorial jurisdiction but must also be viewed in relation to some indirect manner of controlling us, sometimes without our knowledge and sometimes with our consent. Independence must not also be limited to the collectivity but also individually. Independence must be holistic.
The neo imperialistic policies of other states have pervaded us to the extent of diffusing our own identity. Why are the youth so into Justin Bieber? Why do Filipinos prefer foreign products? Why are the names of Filipino babies foreign sounding? Why are the books we read and use in school authored by foreigners? These are some of the salient manifestations that we are not yet truly independent. When I say the latter statement, I have considered every other arguments so as not to sound hypocrite.
If we reconsider our forefathers' objective in seeking the independence of the Philippines from the Spaniards, the Japanese and the Americans, it would point out to one thing--IDENTITY! We wanted to assert our identity as Filipinos (or whatever we were called prior to that name). We wanted them to know that we can stand on our own, that we can govern our own affairs and that we can be at par with the others. The recent developments in the political, social and economic arena have ostensibly led us to give up some of our identity. The internet for instance is a melting pot of information--both good and bad. It is also the primary source of influence which slowly erodes our identity through the easy access to foreign materials which are labeled "better" than our own. The educational institutions which should be the principal molder of our children's nationalism sometimes are also the primary cause why they lose their identity. Nevertheless, it is recognize that the doctrine of auto-limitation is operative in our jurisdiction, thus, whenever we allow foreign powers or authorities or organizations to occupy some of our territories or exercise jurisdiction in some of our political, economic and social spheres, these acts are not necessarily void but are valid as long as they do not violate any provision of our laws and Constitution.
According to last Sunday's message, we can also never be truly independent if we do not have a Supreme Being to whom we can entrust everything which we deem impossible to do within our human capacity. To this end, independence really lies within us. If we individually develop our identity as Filipinos, as lovers of freedom and democracy and of our country, as protectors of our liberty and as a good citizen of the international community, no foreign influence no matter how strong will be able to change what we are. The individual perspective if brought in the collective arena will display our Filipino nation's insignia--we are brown, we are short, but we are brave, we are independent.
Adsum
June 14, 2011
10:44 am
Friday, June 10, 2011
Free Patent
I. Difference between a free patent and a homestead grant
In Republic vs. CA, 352 SCRA 148, March 9, 2001, the Supreme Court held that:
“Homestead Patent and Free Patent are modes of acquiring public land from the Government under C.A. No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
A Homestead is one issued to any citizen of this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of the family, who is not the owner of more than 24 hectares of land since the occupation of the Philippines by the United States
On the other hand, a Free Patent may be issued where the applicant is an natural born citizen of the Philippines, not the owner of more than 12 hectares of land; that he has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or his predecessors-in-interest, a tract of agricultural public land subject to disposition for at least 39 years prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6940, or that he has paid the real taxes thereon while the same is not occupied by other person.”
II. Free Patent or Homestead
En Banc
G.R. Nos. L-5984 and L-5985 January 28, 1954
FRANCISCO SEGOVIA, petitioner,
vs.
PRISCILLA GARCIA, ROSARIO GARCIA, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents;
FRANCISCO SEGOVIA, petitioner,
vs.
SIMPLICIA VILLAPANDO and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
“The provisions which may have bearing on the question now under consideration are sections 116 and 117 of Act 2874, both in force at the time of the issuance of the homestead patents of the parcels of land subject of the action, which are as follows:
SEC. 116. — Lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to .the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
SEC. 117. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, for a period of five years from the date of conveyance.
Section 116 of Act 2874 became Section 118 of Common wealth Act No. 141, promulgated on November 7, 1936, and was amended on June 8, 1939 by Commonwealth Act No. 456 by the addition of the following paragraph:
No alienation, transfer or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.
Section 117 of Act 2874 has become Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
The first question raised in these appeals concerns the meaning of the term "applicant" used in section 117 of Act 2874, or Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No 141. Claim is said that term means one who has applied for a homestead or a free patent, but who has not yet been granted a patent. The argument that had the Legislature intended to extend the right to repurchase to a patentee, the word patentee would have been used in the law instead of applicant, is a plausible one. Were we to accept it, however, section 117 of Act 2874 would become dead letter, as it would have no possible application at all. Under the preceding section (Sec. 116 of Act No. 2874) no conveyance can be made "from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant." Hence, a mere applicant, without patent, may not sell the land applied for before the patent is issued. How can he (applicant), therefore, repurchase a property he may not sell? Clearly, the term "applicant" can mean no other person than a patentee, because only a patentee has the right to make a conveyance and only a vendor can have the right to make a repurchase. This conclusion is reinforced by the use of the clause "when proper" in said section 117, under which conveyance is proper only after, not before, the expiration of five years from the issuance of the patent. The additional argument that the law has no reason to protect a patentee, as it has the interest of a mere applicant without a patent, has long ago been rejected by us in the case of Abendaño vs. Hao Su Ton, 47 Off. Gaz., 6359, where we said:
The contention that under the terms of section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141, a patentee or grantee of homestead land has no right to repurchase, because such right is granted only to the "applicant", is untenable because the section clearly speaks of "conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead," 'and it is obvious that before issuance of the patent (or at least before final proof), the applicant has not acquired the land. The term "applicant" in the section involved is evidently descriptive and purports to identify the one in whose name .the patent was issued. The plain intent of the law is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State has granted him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it; and this purpose would be defeated by the construction proposed by the applicant. (Pascua vs. Talens, 80 Phil., 792.)
In consonance with the above, we decide and hold that the term "applicant" as used in Section 117 of Act 2874, now Section 119 of the Public Land Law, Commonwealth Act No. 141, should be interpreted to mean the holder of a patent, whether a homestead patent or a free patent.
III. Right to repurchase is not limited to the applicant/grantee alone but extends to his legal heirs
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23245 July 31, 1968
JUANITA RIVERA, petitioner, vs. SILVINO CURAMEN, respondent.
Under the law, every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions of existing laws shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs, within five years from the date of the conveyance. Assuming that the original grantees, Silvino Curamen and his widow, had lost their right to repurchase the properties — in the case of the first because of the sale of his right to repurchase made on April 1, 1955, and in that of the second because of the quit-claim already referred to — it does not necessarily follow that their legal heirs had likewise lost their right to repurchase that they would be entitled to repurchase only their share as heirs of their deceased father who died after instituting the present case for reconveyance. The law clearly grants them the right to repurchase the property covered by a free patent or a homestead title within five years from the date of the conveyance. Speaking specifically of the present case, that right is not limited to the repurchase of the share corresponding to their father only, because the latter is already dead, but refers to the repurchase of the property — meaning the whole of it. This, in our opinion, is the only logical meaning to be given to the law which — because its purpose is to enable the family of the applicant or grantee to keep their homestead (Lustado vs. Pinol, et al., G.R. L-10825, September 27, 1957) — must be liberally construed in order to carry out that purpose.
The quit-claim executed by Dominga Barcelona can not have the effect of depriving her children of their right to repurchase. Assuming that it is valid, it binds her alone.
DBP vs. Gagarani, G.R. No. 172248, September 17, 2008
The plain intent of Sec. 119 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve and keep in the family the land that the State has gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in cleaning, developing and cultivating it.[17] Hence, the fact that the land had been inherited by the patentees’ son (and a new title in his name issued) does not bring it outside the purview of Sec. 119. In fact, the policy behind the law is fulfilled because the land remains in the family of the patentee. As we explained in Ferrer v. Mangente:[18]
The applicant for a homestead is to be given all the inducement that the law offers and is entitled to its full protection. Its blessings, however, do not stop with him. This is particularly so in this case as the appellee is the son of the deceased. There is no question then as to his status of being a legal heir. The policy of the law is not difficult to understand. The incentive for a pioneer to venture into developing virgin land becomes more attractive if he is assured that his effort will not go for naught should perchance his life be cut short. This is merely a recognition of how closely bound parents and children are in a Filipino family. Logic, the sense of fitness and of right, as well as pragmatic considerations thus call for continued adherence to the policy that not the individual applicant alone but those so closely related to him as are entitled to legal succession may take full advantage of the benefits the law confers.[19]
Having ruled that Sec. 119 is applicable to this case, we now go to the next issue: are respondents the “legal heirs” contemplated in the provision?
Petitioner argues that respondents are not the legal heirs of the patentees because respondents are merely their daughter-in-law and grandchildren.
The term “legal heirs” is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves a legitime for them.
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents. They should be considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.
The above interpretation of "legal heirs" as contra-distinguished from the restrictive construction given it by the lower court is more in keeping with the salutary purpose behind the enactment of Section 119 and the jurisprudence laid down on the matter. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to arrive at a more liberal conclusion if the section is analyzed in accordance with its purpose xxxx[22]
Respondents inherited the property from Asok, their husband and father, who in turn inherited it from his parents. Respondent Ella Gagarani Asok, as daughter-in-law of the patentees, can be considered as among the legal heirs who can repurchase the land in accordance with Salenillas v. CA.[23] In that case, we allowed the daughter and son-in-law of the patentees to repurchase the property because this would be “more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.”[24] Furthermore, the law must be liberally construed in order to carry out its purpose.[25]
IV. Conveyance contemplated must be to third persons (not family members)
EDUARDO FONTANILLA, SR. and ELLEN M. T. FONTANILLA, petitioners, vs. HON COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS DUAMAN, respondents
Echoing the ratiocination of the lower court, petitioners also aver that assuming arguendo that private respondent can still exercise his right to repurchase under Section 119, the same is already time-barred. In support of this averment, petitioners reckon the five-year period to repurchase from 21 July 1976 when private respondent conveyed the subject lot to his sons. When the complaint was filed with the lower court on 20 June 1989, more than five (5) years had lapsed and prescription of the right to repurchase had allegedly already set in.
This contention is likewise untenable. As correctly held by the CA, the transfer of the subject lot by the father (private respondent Luis) to his sons (Ernesto and Elpidio) is not the "conveyance" contemplated by Section 119 because the subject lot remains in the family of the homesteaders, the transferee being their direct descendants. The avowed fundamental policy of Section 119, e.g., "to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public land which the State had gratuitously given to him,"[6] is clearly not violated by said conveyance.
Thus, in Lasud vs. Lasud,[7] we declared that the sale by the daughter of the homesteader of her one-half share in the homestead to her brother (son of the homesteaders) "does not fall within the purpose, spirit and meaning of the provision of the Public Land Act (Com. Act No. 141, Section 119) authorizing redemption of the homestead from any vendee thereof."[8] We quoted with approval the disquisition of the lower court in this case as follows:
"x x x Considering that Sec. 119 of the Public land Law aims to preserve in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public domain which the State had gratuitously given to him, it is apparent that the conveyance mentioned therein refers to an alienation made to a third person outside the family circle. And certainly the defendant Santay Lasud can not be considered a third person in relation to the original homesteader, his father, because there is a privity of interest between him and his father, the defendant Santay Lasud being the continuity of the legal personality of the former. So much so, that the sale made by the plaintiff, Sigbe Lasud, to her brother, the defendant Santay Lasud, can not be a 'proper' case to be brought under the operations of Sec. 119 of the Public Land Law, because such a sale does not take the land out of the family circle of the homesteader their father that is, the sale is not in contravention of an avowed fundamental policy, which is, to preserve and keep [in] the family of the homesteader,' the land granted to him by the State."[9]
Since the transfer of the subject lot by private respondent to his sons does not fall within the purview of Section 119, it necessarily follows that the five-year period to repurchase cannot be reckoned from the date of said conveyance. Rather, the date of conveyance for the purpose of counting the five-year period to repurchase under Section 119 is that "alienation made to a third party outside of the family circle"[10] which in this case was the conveyance of the subject lot to petitioners on 8 August 1985. Accordingly, private respondent's complaint for the repurchase of the subject lot, which was filed on 20 June 1989, was not time-barred as not more than five (5) years had lapsed since the date of its conveyance to petitioners.
V. Failure of the patentee-vendor to secure the approval of the Secretary of DENR does not ipso facto make the sale void
Bajenting vs. Banes, G.R. No. 166190, September 20, 2006
OCT No. P-5677 was issued to and in the name of Venancio Bajenting over the property on February 6, 1976. The 25-year period provided in Section 118 of the law was to expire on February 6, 2001. However, in May 1999, Felisa Bajenting and her children sold the property to respondents without the approval of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (formerly the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources). There is no showing in the records that the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources had approved the sale.
The failure of the vendors to secure the approval of the Secretary of the DENR does not, ipso facto, make the sale void. The approval may be secured later, producing the effect of ratifying and adopting the transaction as if the sale had been previously authorized. The approval of the sale subsequent thereto would have the effect of the Secretary’s ratification and adoption as if the sale had been previously authorized.[47] The Secretary may disapprove the sale on legal grounds.
VI. Right to repurchase if sold in public sale
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES TIMOTEO and SELFIDA S. PIÑEDA, respondents.
Section 119 does not contain any prohibition to convey homestead land but grants the homesteader, his widow or legal heirs a right to repurchase said land within a period of five years in the event that he conveys said land. This is in consonance with the policy of homestead laws to distribute disposable agricultural lands of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation.[29] The right to repurchase under Section 119 aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given him.[30] Such right is based on the assumption that the person under obligation to reconvey the property has the full title to the property because it was voluntarily conveyed to him or that he consolidated his title thereto by reason of a redemptioner’s failure to exercise his right of redemption.[31] It is also settled that “the five-year period of redemption fixed in Section 119 of the Public Land Law of homestead sold at extrajudicial foreclosure begins to run from the day after the expiration of the one-year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure”.[32] Thus DBP’s consolidation of title did not derogate from or impair the right of the PIÑEDAS to redeem the same under C.A.
DBP vs. Gagarani, G.R. No. 172248, September 17, 2008
This is far from a novel issue. It was already resolved in Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. CA:[26]
Thus, the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of land acquired under free patent or homestead statutes may be summarized as follows: xxx If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption period also pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act.[27]
There is no dispute that in extrajudicial foreclosures under Act 3135, the debtor or his or her successors-in-interest may redeem the property within one year. This redemption period should be reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale.[28] The five-year period fixed in Sec. 119 begins to run from the expiration of the one-year redemption period.[29] Here, the certificate of sale was registered on December 24, 1992 and the one-year redemption period expired on December 24, 1993. Reckoned from that day, respondents had a five-year period, or until December 24, 1998, to exercise their right to repurchase under Sec. 119 of CA 141. Consequently, the CA was correct in holding that the complaint filed on May 15, 1998 was on time.
VII. Conveyance: meaning
Under the case of CODIDI MATA, CELESTINO, LUCIA, INGRACIO, PIO, MARCELO, MELETON, RICARDA, PAGAKAN, and CARING, all surnamed MATA, and duly represented by their attorney-in-fact ISIDRO SEMBRANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF CLARO L. LAURETA,respondents, [G.R. No. 103476. November 18, 1999], the Supreme Court had the occasion to define the term conveyance in relation to Section 119, CA 141 (now Section 119, PD 1529):
The next issue is whether or not petitioners can still validly exercise their right to repurchase the subject property pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land
"Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five (5) years from date of conveyance,"
The term "conveyance" imports the transfer of legal title from one person to another. It usually takes place upon the execution of the deed purporting to transfer the ownership of the land as the same is already valid and binding against the parties thereto even without the act of registration. The registration is intended to protect the buyer against claims of third parties against subsequent alienations by the vendor, and is certainly not necessary to give effect, as between the parties, to their deed of sale. Thus, for the purpose of reckoning the five-year period to exercise the right to repurchase, the date of conveyance is construed to refer to the date of the execution of the deed transferring the ownership of the land to the buyer.[16]
In this case, Mata conveyed the ownership of the subject property to Laureta by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
The same conclusion would obtain even if the running of the five-year period were to start from 9 May 1985, when Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46346 covering the subject property was issued in favor Laureta after the sale in his favor was approved by the Minister of Natural Resources in accordance with the decision in Civil Case No. 3083, petitioners’ action to repurchase the subject property would still be time-barred, as more than five (5) years had already lapsed.
Petitioners further argue that the five-year period should be reckoned from September 1990, when the decision of this Court in Laureta[18] allegedly became final and executory. Petitioners maintain that prior to the said date, they could not exercise their right to repurchase since the issue of its ownership was still then under litigation. This contention is without merit. As earlier discussed, the act of conveyance within the meaning of the Section 119 of the Public Land
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June 7, 2011
3:14pm
I. Difference between a free patent and a homestead grant
In Republic vs. CA, 352 SCRA 148, March 9, 2001, the Supreme Court held that:
“Homestead Patent and Free Patent are modes of acquiring public land from the Government under C.A. No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
A Homestead is one issued to any citizen of this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of the family, who is not the owner of more than 24 hectares of land since the occupation of the Philippines by the United States
On the other hand, a Free Patent may be issued where the applicant is an natural born citizen of the Philippines, not the owner of more than 12 hectares of land; that he has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or his predecessors-in-interest, a tract of agricultural public land subject to disposition for at least 39 years prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6940, or that he has paid the real taxes thereon while the same is not occupied by other person.”
II. Free Patent or Homestead
En Banc
G.R. Nos. L-5984 and L-5985 January 28, 1954
FRANCISCO SEGOVIA, petitioner,
vs.
PRISCILLA GARCIA, ROSARIO GARCIA, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents;
FRANCISCO SEGOVIA, petitioner,
vs.
SIMPLICIA VILLAPANDO and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
“The provisions which may have bearing on the question now under consideration are sections 116 and 117 of Act 2874, both in force at the time of the issuance of the homestead patents of the parcels of land subject of the action, which are as follows:
SEC. 116. — Lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to .the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
SEC. 117. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, for a period of five years from the date of conveyance.
Section 116 of Act 2874 became Section 118 of Common wealth Act No. 141, promulgated on November 7, 1936, and was amended on June 8, 1939 by Commonwealth Act No. 456 by the addition of the following paragraph:
No alienation, transfer or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.
Section 117 of Act 2874 has become Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
The first question raised in these appeals concerns the meaning of the term "applicant" used in section 117 of Act 2874, or Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No 141. Claim is said that term means one who has applied for a homestead or a free patent, but who has not yet been granted a patent. The argument that had the Legislature intended to extend the right to repurchase to a patentee, the word patentee would have been used in the law instead of applicant, is a plausible one. Were we to accept it, however, section 117 of Act 2874 would become dead letter, as it would have no possible application at all. Under the preceding section (Sec. 116 of Act No. 2874) no conveyance can be made "from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant." Hence, a mere applicant, without patent, may not sell the land applied for before the patent is issued. How can he (applicant), therefore, repurchase a property he may not sell? Clearly, the term "applicant" can mean no other person than a patentee, because only a patentee has the right to make a conveyance and only a vendor can have the right to make a repurchase. This conclusion is reinforced by the use of the clause "when proper" in said section 117, under which conveyance is proper only after, not before, the expiration of five years from the issuance of the patent. The additional argument that the law has no reason to protect a patentee, as it has the interest of a mere applicant without a patent, has long ago been rejected by us in the case of Abendaño vs. Hao Su Ton, 47 Off. Gaz., 6359, where we said:
The contention that under the terms of section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141, a patentee or grantee of homestead land has no right to repurchase, because such right is granted only to the "applicant", is untenable because the section clearly speaks of "conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead," 'and it is obvious that before issuance of the patent (or at least before final proof), the applicant has not acquired the land. The term "applicant" in the section involved is evidently descriptive and purports to identify the one in whose name .the patent was issued. The plain intent of the law is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State has granted him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it; and this purpose would be defeated by the construction proposed by the applicant. (Pascua vs. Talens, 80 Phil., 792.)
In consonance with the above, we decide and hold that the term "applicant" as used in Section 117 of Act 2874, now Section 119 of the Public Land Law, Commonwealth Act No. 141, should be interpreted to mean the holder of a patent, whether a homestead patent or a free patent.
III. Right to repurchase is not limited to the applicant/grantee alone but extends to his legal heirs
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23245 July 31, 1968
JUANITA RIVERA, petitioner, vs. SILVINO CURAMEN, respondent.
Under the law, every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions of existing laws shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs, within five years from the date of the conveyance. Assuming that the original grantees, Silvino Curamen and his widow, had lost their right to repurchase the properties — in the case of the first because of the sale of his right to repurchase made on April 1, 1955, and in that of the second because of the quit-claim already referred to — it does not necessarily follow that their legal heirs had likewise lost their right to repurchase that they would be entitled to repurchase only their share as heirs of their deceased father who died after instituting the present case for reconveyance. The law clearly grants them the right to repurchase the property covered by a free patent or a homestead title within five years from the date of the conveyance. Speaking specifically of the present case, that right is not limited to the repurchase of the share corresponding to their father only, because the latter is already dead, but refers to the repurchase of the property — meaning the whole of it. This, in our opinion, is the only logical meaning to be given to the law which — because its purpose is to enable the family of the applicant or grantee to keep their homestead (Lustado vs. Pinol, et al., G.R. L-10825, September 27, 1957) — must be liberally construed in order to carry out that purpose.
The quit-claim executed by Dominga Barcelona can not have the effect of depriving her children of their right to repurchase. Assuming that it is valid, it binds her alone.
DBP vs. Gagarani, G.R. No. 172248, September 17, 2008
The plain intent of Sec. 119 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve and keep in the family the land that the State has gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in cleaning, developing and cultivating it.[17] Hence, the fact that the land had been inherited by the patentees’ son (and a new title in his name issued) does not bring it outside the purview of Sec. 119. In fact, the policy behind the law is fulfilled because the land remains in the family of the patentee. As we explained in Ferrer v. Mangente:[18]
The applicant for a homestead is to be given all the inducement that the law offers and is entitled to its full protection. Its blessings, however, do not stop with him. This is particularly so in this case as the appellee is the son of the deceased. There is no question then as to his status of being a legal heir. The policy of the law is not difficult to understand. The incentive for a pioneer to venture into developing virgin land becomes more attractive if he is assured that his effort will not go for naught should perchance his life be cut short. This is merely a recognition of how closely bound parents and children are in a Filipino family. Logic, the sense of fitness and of right, as well as pragmatic considerations thus call for continued adherence to the policy that not the individual applicant alone but those so closely related to him as are entitled to legal succession may take full advantage of the benefits the law confers.[19]
Having ruled that Sec. 119 is applicable to this case, we now go to the next issue: are respondents the “legal heirs” contemplated in the provision?
Petitioner argues that respondents are not the legal heirs of the patentees because respondents are merely their daughter-in-law and grandchildren.
The term “legal heirs” is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves a legitime for them.
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents. They should be considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.
The above interpretation of "legal heirs" as contra-distinguished from the restrictive construction given it by the lower court is more in keeping with the salutary purpose behind the enactment of Section 119 and the jurisprudence laid down on the matter. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to arrive at a more liberal conclusion if the section is analyzed in accordance with its purpose xxxx[22]
Respondents inherited the property from Asok, their husband and father, who in turn inherited it from his parents. Respondent Ella Gagarani Asok, as daughter-in-law of the patentees, can be considered as among the legal heirs who can repurchase the land in accordance with Salenillas v. CA.[23] In that case, we allowed the daughter and son-in-law of the patentees to repurchase the property because this would be “more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.”[24] Furthermore, the law must be liberally construed in order to carry out its purpose.[25]
IV. Conveyance contemplated must be to third persons (not family members)
EDUARDO FONTANILLA, SR. and ELLEN M. T. FONTANILLA, petitioners, vs. HON COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS DUAMAN, respondents
Echoing the ratiocination of the lower court, petitioners also aver that assuming arguendo that private respondent can still exercise his right to repurchase under Section 119, the same is already time-barred. In support of this averment, petitioners reckon the five-year period to repurchase from 21 July 1976 when private respondent conveyed the subject lot to his sons. When the complaint was filed with the lower court on 20 June 1989, more than five (5) years had lapsed and prescription of the right to repurchase had allegedly already set in.
This contention is likewise untenable. As correctly held by the CA, the transfer of the subject lot by the father (private respondent Luis) to his sons (Ernesto and Elpidio) is not the "conveyance" contemplated by Section 119 because the subject lot remains in the family of the homesteaders, the transferee being their direct descendants. The avowed fundamental policy of Section 119, e.g., "to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public land which the State had gratuitously given to him,"[6] is clearly not violated by said conveyance.
Thus, in Lasud vs. Lasud,[7] we declared that the sale by the daughter of the homesteader of her one-half share in the homestead to her brother (son of the homesteaders) "does not fall within the purpose, spirit and meaning of the provision of the Public Land Act (Com. Act No. 141, Section 119) authorizing redemption of the homestead from any vendee thereof."[8] We quoted with approval the disquisition of the lower court in this case as follows:
"x x x Considering that Sec. 119 of the Public land Law aims to preserve in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public domain which the State had gratuitously given to him, it is apparent that the conveyance mentioned therein refers to an alienation made to a third person outside the family circle. And certainly the defendant Santay Lasud can not be considered a third person in relation to the original homesteader, his father, because there is a privity of interest between him and his father, the defendant Santay Lasud being the continuity of the legal personality of the former. So much so, that the sale made by the plaintiff, Sigbe Lasud, to her brother, the defendant Santay Lasud, can not be a 'proper' case to be brought under the operations of Sec. 119 of the Public Land Law, because such a sale does not take the land out of the family circle of the homesteader their father that is, the sale is not in contravention of an avowed fundamental policy, which is, to preserve and keep [in] the family of the homesteader,' the land granted to him by the State."[9]
Since the transfer of the subject lot by private respondent to his sons does not fall within the purview of Section 119, it necessarily follows that the five-year period to repurchase cannot be reckoned from the date of said conveyance. Rather, the date of conveyance for the purpose of counting the five-year period to repurchase under Section 119 is that "alienation made to a third party outside of the family circle"[10] which in this case was the conveyance of the subject lot to petitioners on 8 August 1985. Accordingly, private respondent's complaint for the repurchase of the subject lot, which was filed on 20 June 1989, was not time-barred as not more than five (5) years had lapsed since the date of its conveyance to petitioners.
V. Failure of the patentee-vendor to secure the approval of the Secretary of DENR does not ipso facto make the sale void
Bajenting vs. Banes, G.R. No. 166190, September 20, 2006
OCT No. P-5677 was issued to and in the name of Venancio Bajenting over the property on February 6, 1976. The 25-year period provided in Section 118 of the law was to expire on February 6, 2001. However, in May 1999, Felisa Bajenting and her children sold the property to respondents without the approval of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (formerly the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources). There is no showing in the records that the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources had approved the sale.
The failure of the vendors to secure the approval of the Secretary of the DENR does not, ipso facto, make the sale void. The approval may be secured later, producing the effect of ratifying and adopting the transaction as if the sale had been previously authorized. The approval of the sale subsequent thereto would have the effect of the Secretary’s ratification and adoption as if the sale had been previously authorized.[47] The Secretary may disapprove the sale on legal grounds.
VI. Right to repurchase if sold in public sale
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES TIMOTEO and SELFIDA S. PIÑEDA, respondents.
Section 119 does not contain any prohibition to convey homestead land but grants the homesteader, his widow or legal heirs a right to repurchase said land within a period of five years in the event that he conveys said land. This is in consonance with the policy of homestead laws to distribute disposable agricultural lands of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation.[29] The right to repurchase under Section 119 aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given him.[30] Such right is based on the assumption that the person under obligation to reconvey the property has the full title to the property because it was voluntarily conveyed to him or that he consolidated his title thereto by reason of a redemptioner’s failure to exercise his right of redemption.[31] It is also settled that “the five-year period of redemption fixed in Section 119 of the Public Land Law of homestead sold at extrajudicial foreclosure begins to run from the day after the expiration of the one-year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure”.[32] Thus DBP’s consolidation of title did not derogate from or impair the right of the PIÑEDAS to redeem the same under C.A.
DBP vs. Gagarani, G.R. No. 172248, September 17, 2008
This is far from a novel issue. It was already resolved in Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. CA:[26]
Thus, the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of land acquired under free patent or homestead statutes may be summarized as follows: xxx If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption period also pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act.[27]
There is no dispute that in extrajudicial foreclosures under Act 3135, the debtor or his or her successors-in-interest may redeem the property within one year. This redemption period should be reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale.[28] The five-year period fixed in Sec. 119 begins to run from the expiration of the one-year redemption period.[29] Here, the certificate of sale was registered on December 24, 1992 and the one-year redemption period expired on December 24, 1993. Reckoned from that day, respondents had a five-year period, or until December 24, 1998, to exercise their right to repurchase under Sec. 119 of CA 141. Consequently, the CA was correct in holding that the complaint filed on May 15, 1998 was on time.
VII. Conveyance: meaning
Under the case of CODIDI MATA, CELESTINO, LUCIA, INGRACIO, PIO, MARCELO, MELETON, RICARDA, PAGAKAN, and CARING, all surnamed MATA, and duly represented by their attorney-in-fact ISIDRO SEMBRANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF CLARO L. LAURETA,respondents, [G.R. No. 103476. November 18, 1999], the Supreme Court had the occasion to define the term conveyance in relation to Section 119, CA 141 (now Section 119, PD 1529):
The next issue is whether or not petitioners can still validly exercise their right to repurchase the subject property pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land
"Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five (5) years from date of conveyance,"
The term "conveyance" imports the transfer of legal title from one person to another. It usually takes place upon the execution of the deed purporting to transfer the ownership of the land as the same is already valid and binding against the parties thereto even without the act of registration. The registration is intended to protect the buyer against claims of third parties against subsequent alienations by the vendor, and is certainly not necessary to give effect, as between the parties, to their deed of sale. Thus, for the purpose of reckoning the five-year period to exercise the right to repurchase, the date of conveyance is construed to refer to the date of the execution of the deed transferring the ownership of the land to the buyer.[16]
In this case, Mata conveyed the ownership of the subject property to Laureta by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
The same conclusion would obtain even if the running of the five-year period were to start from 9 May 1985, when Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46346 covering the subject property was issued in favor Laureta after the sale in his favor was approved by the Minister of Natural Resources in accordance with the decision in Civil Case No. 3083, petitioners’ action to repurchase the subject property would still be time-barred, as more than five (5) years had already lapsed.
Petitioners further argue that the five-year period should be reckoned from September 1990, when the decision of this Court in Laureta[18] allegedly became final and executory. Petitioners maintain that prior to the said date, they could not exercise their right to repurchase since the issue of its ownership was still then under litigation. This contention is without merit. As earlier discussed, the act of conveyance within the meaning of the Section 119 of the Public Land
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June 7, 2011
3:14pm
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