I. Difference between a free patent and a homestead grant
In Republic vs. CA, 352 SCRA 148, March 9, 2001, the Supreme Court held that:
“Homestead Patent and Free Patent are modes of acquiring public land from the Government under C.A. No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
A Homestead is one issued to any citizen of this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of the family, who is not the owner of more than 24 hectares of land since the occupation of the Philippines by the United States
On the other hand, a Free Patent may be issued where the applicant is an natural born citizen of the Philippines, not the owner of more than 12 hectares of land; that he has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or his predecessors-in-interest, a tract of agricultural public land subject to disposition for at least 39 years prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6940, or that he has paid the real taxes thereon while the same is not occupied by other person.”
II. Free Patent or Homestead
En Banc
G.R. Nos. L-5984 and L-5985 January 28, 1954
FRANCISCO SEGOVIA, petitioner,
vs.
PRISCILLA GARCIA, ROSARIO GARCIA, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents;
FRANCISCO SEGOVIA, petitioner,
vs.
SIMPLICIA VILLAPANDO and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
“The provisions which may have bearing on the question now under consideration are sections 116 and 117 of Act 2874, both in force at the time of the issuance of the homestead patents of the parcels of land subject of the action, which are as follows:
SEC. 116. — Lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to .the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
SEC. 117. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, for a period of five years from the date of conveyance.
Section 116 of Act 2874 became Section 118 of Common wealth Act No. 141, promulgated on November 7, 1936, and was amended on June 8, 1939 by Commonwealth Act No. 456 by the addition of the following paragraph:
No alienation, transfer or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.
Section 117 of Act 2874 has become Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
The first question raised in these appeals concerns the meaning of the term "applicant" used in section 117 of Act 2874, or Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No 141. Claim is said that term means one who has applied for a homestead or a free patent, but who has not yet been granted a patent. The argument that had the Legislature intended to extend the right to repurchase to a patentee, the word patentee would have been used in the law instead of applicant, is a plausible one. Were we to accept it, however, section 117 of Act 2874 would become dead letter, as it would have no possible application at all. Under the preceding section (Sec. 116 of Act No. 2874) no conveyance can be made "from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant." Hence, a mere applicant, without patent, may not sell the land applied for before the patent is issued. How can he (applicant), therefore, repurchase a property he may not sell? Clearly, the term "applicant" can mean no other person than a patentee, because only a patentee has the right to make a conveyance and only a vendor can have the right to make a repurchase. This conclusion is reinforced by the use of the clause "when proper" in said section 117, under which conveyance is proper only after, not before, the expiration of five years from the issuance of the patent. The additional argument that the law has no reason to protect a patentee, as it has the interest of a mere applicant without a patent, has long ago been rejected by us in the case of Abendaño vs. Hao Su Ton, 47 Off. Gaz., 6359, where we said:
The contention that under the terms of section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141, a patentee or grantee of homestead land has no right to repurchase, because such right is granted only to the "applicant", is untenable because the section clearly speaks of "conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead," 'and it is obvious that before issuance of the patent (or at least before final proof), the applicant has not acquired the land. The term "applicant" in the section involved is evidently descriptive and purports to identify the one in whose name .the patent was issued. The plain intent of the law is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State has granted him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it; and this purpose would be defeated by the construction proposed by the applicant. (Pascua vs. Talens, 80 Phil., 792.)
In consonance with the above, we decide and hold that the term "applicant" as used in Section 117 of Act 2874, now Section 119 of the Public Land Law, Commonwealth Act No. 141, should be interpreted to mean the holder of a patent, whether a homestead patent or a free patent.
III. Right to repurchase is not limited to the applicant/grantee alone but extends to his legal heirs
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23245 July 31, 1968
JUANITA RIVERA, petitioner, vs. SILVINO CURAMEN, respondent.
Under the law, every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions of existing laws shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs, within five years from the date of the conveyance. Assuming that the original grantees, Silvino Curamen and his widow, had lost their right to repurchase the properties — in the case of the first because of the sale of his right to repurchase made on April 1, 1955, and in that of the second because of the quit-claim already referred to — it does not necessarily follow that their legal heirs had likewise lost their right to repurchase that they would be entitled to repurchase only their share as heirs of their deceased father who died after instituting the present case for reconveyance. The law clearly grants them the right to repurchase the property covered by a free patent or a homestead title within five years from the date of the conveyance. Speaking specifically of the present case, that right is not limited to the repurchase of the share corresponding to their father only, because the latter is already dead, but refers to the repurchase of the property — meaning the whole of it. This, in our opinion, is the only logical meaning to be given to the law which — because its purpose is to enable the family of the applicant or grantee to keep their homestead (Lustado vs. Pinol, et al., G.R. L-10825, September 27, 1957) — must be liberally construed in order to carry out that purpose.
The quit-claim executed by Dominga Barcelona can not have the effect of depriving her children of their right to repurchase. Assuming that it is valid, it binds her alone.
DBP vs. Gagarani, G.R. No. 172248, September 17, 2008
The plain intent of Sec. 119 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve and keep in the family the land that the State has gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in cleaning, developing and cultivating it.[17] Hence, the fact that the land had been inherited by the patentees’ son (and a new title in his name issued) does not bring it outside the purview of Sec. 119. In fact, the policy behind the law is fulfilled because the land remains in the family of the patentee. As we explained in Ferrer v. Mangente:[18]
The applicant for a homestead is to be given all the inducement that the law offers and is entitled to its full protection. Its blessings, however, do not stop with him. This is particularly so in this case as the appellee is the son of the deceased. There is no question then as to his status of being a legal heir. The policy of the law is not difficult to understand. The incentive for a pioneer to venture into developing virgin land becomes more attractive if he is assured that his effort will not go for naught should perchance his life be cut short. This is merely a recognition of how closely bound parents and children are in a Filipino family. Logic, the sense of fitness and of right, as well as pragmatic considerations thus call for continued adherence to the policy that not the individual applicant alone but those so closely related to him as are entitled to legal succession may take full advantage of the benefits the law confers.[19]
Having ruled that Sec. 119 is applicable to this case, we now go to the next issue: are respondents the “legal heirs” contemplated in the provision?
Petitioner argues that respondents are not the legal heirs of the patentees because respondents are merely their daughter-in-law and grandchildren.
The term “legal heirs” is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves a legitime for them.
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents. They should be considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.
The above interpretation of "legal heirs" as contra-distinguished from the restrictive construction given it by the lower court is more in keeping with the salutary purpose behind the enactment of Section 119 and the jurisprudence laid down on the matter. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to arrive at a more liberal conclusion if the section is analyzed in accordance with its purpose xxxx[22]
Respondents inherited the property from Asok, their husband and father, who in turn inherited it from his parents. Respondent Ella Gagarani Asok, as daughter-in-law of the patentees, can be considered as among the legal heirs who can repurchase the land in accordance with Salenillas v. CA.[23] In that case, we allowed the daughter and son-in-law of the patentees to repurchase the property because this would be “more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.”[24] Furthermore, the law must be liberally construed in order to carry out its purpose.[25]
IV. Conveyance contemplated must be to third persons (not family members)
EDUARDO FONTANILLA, SR. and ELLEN M. T. FONTANILLA, petitioners, vs. HON COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS DUAMAN, respondents
Echoing the ratiocination of the lower court, petitioners also aver that assuming arguendo that private respondent can still exercise his right to repurchase under Section 119, the same is already time-barred. In support of this averment, petitioners reckon the five-year period to repurchase from 21 July 1976 when private respondent conveyed the subject lot to his sons. When the complaint was filed with the lower court on 20 June 1989, more than five (5) years had lapsed and prescription of the right to repurchase had allegedly already set in.
This contention is likewise untenable. As correctly held by the CA, the transfer of the subject lot by the father (private respondent Luis) to his sons (Ernesto and Elpidio) is not the "conveyance" contemplated by Section 119 because the subject lot remains in the family of the homesteaders, the transferee being their direct descendants. The avowed fundamental policy of Section 119, e.g., "to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public land which the State had gratuitously given to him,"[6] is clearly not violated by said conveyance.
Thus, in Lasud vs. Lasud,[7] we declared that the sale by the daughter of the homesteader of her one-half share in the homestead to her brother (son of the homesteaders) "does not fall within the purpose, spirit and meaning of the provision of the Public Land Act (Com. Act No. 141, Section 119) authorizing redemption of the homestead from any vendee thereof."[8] We quoted with approval the disquisition of the lower court in this case as follows:
"x x x Considering that Sec. 119 of the Public land Law aims to preserve in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public domain which the State had gratuitously given to him, it is apparent that the conveyance mentioned therein refers to an alienation made to a third person outside the family circle. And certainly the defendant Santay Lasud can not be considered a third person in relation to the original homesteader, his father, because there is a privity of interest between him and his father, the defendant Santay Lasud being the continuity of the legal personality of the former. So much so, that the sale made by the plaintiff, Sigbe Lasud, to her brother, the defendant Santay Lasud, can not be a 'proper' case to be brought under the operations of Sec. 119 of the Public Land Law, because such a sale does not take the land out of the family circle of the homesteader their father that is, the sale is not in contravention of an avowed fundamental policy, which is, to preserve and keep [in] the family of the homesteader,' the land granted to him by the State."[9]
Since the transfer of the subject lot by private respondent to his sons does not fall within the purview of Section 119, it necessarily follows that the five-year period to repurchase cannot be reckoned from the date of said conveyance. Rather, the date of conveyance for the purpose of counting the five-year period to repurchase under Section 119 is that "alienation made to a third party outside of the family circle"[10] which in this case was the conveyance of the subject lot to petitioners on 8 August 1985. Accordingly, private respondent's complaint for the repurchase of the subject lot, which was filed on 20 June 1989, was not time-barred as not more than five (5) years had lapsed since the date of its conveyance to petitioners.
V. Failure of the patentee-vendor to secure the approval of the Secretary of DENR does not ipso facto make the sale void
Bajenting vs. Banes, G.R. No. 166190, September 20, 2006
OCT No. P-5677 was issued to and in the name of Venancio Bajenting over the property on February 6, 1976. The 25-year period provided in Section 118 of the law was to expire on February 6, 2001. However, in May 1999, Felisa Bajenting and her children sold the property to respondents without the approval of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (formerly the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources). There is no showing in the records that the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources had approved the sale.
The failure of the vendors to secure the approval of the Secretary of the DENR does not, ipso facto, make the sale void. The approval may be secured later, producing the effect of ratifying and adopting the transaction as if the sale had been previously authorized. The approval of the sale subsequent thereto would have the effect of the Secretary’s ratification and adoption as if the sale had been previously authorized.[47] The Secretary may disapprove the sale on legal grounds.
VI. Right to repurchase if sold in public sale
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES TIMOTEO and SELFIDA S. PIÑEDA, respondents.
Section 119 does not contain any prohibition to convey homestead land but grants the homesteader, his widow or legal heirs a right to repurchase said land within a period of five years in the event that he conveys said land. This is in consonance with the policy of homestead laws to distribute disposable agricultural lands of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation.[29] The right to repurchase under Section 119 aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given him.[30] Such right is based on the assumption that the person under obligation to reconvey the property has the full title to the property because it was voluntarily conveyed to him or that he consolidated his title thereto by reason of a redemptioner’s failure to exercise his right of redemption.[31] It is also settled that “the five-year period of redemption fixed in Section 119 of the Public Land Law of homestead sold at extrajudicial foreclosure begins to run from the day after the expiration of the one-year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure”.[32] Thus DBP’s consolidation of title did not derogate from or impair the right of the PIÑEDAS to redeem the same under C.A.
DBP vs. Gagarani, G.R. No. 172248, September 17, 2008
This is far from a novel issue. It was already resolved in Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. CA:[26]
Thus, the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of land acquired under free patent or homestead statutes may be summarized as follows: xxx If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption period also pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act.[27]
There is no dispute that in extrajudicial foreclosures under Act 3135, the debtor or his or her successors-in-interest may redeem the property within one year. This redemption period should be reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale.[28] The five-year period fixed in Sec. 119 begins to run from the expiration of the one-year redemption period.[29] Here, the certificate of sale was registered on December 24, 1992 and the one-year redemption period expired on December 24, 1993. Reckoned from that day, respondents had a five-year period, or until December 24, 1998, to exercise their right to repurchase under Sec. 119 of CA 141. Consequently, the CA was correct in holding that the complaint filed on May 15, 1998 was on time.
VII. Conveyance: meaning
Under the case of CODIDI MATA, CELESTINO, LUCIA, INGRACIO, PIO, MARCELO, MELETON, RICARDA, PAGAKAN, and CARING, all surnamed MATA, and duly represented by their attorney-in-fact ISIDRO SEMBRANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF CLARO L. LAURETA,respondents, [G.R. No. 103476. November 18, 1999], the Supreme Court had the occasion to define the term conveyance in relation to Section 119, CA 141 (now Section 119, PD 1529):
The next issue is whether or not petitioners can still validly exercise their right to repurchase the subject property pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land
"Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five (5) years from date of conveyance,"
The term "conveyance" imports the transfer of legal title from one person to another. It usually takes place upon the execution of the deed purporting to transfer the ownership of the land as the same is already valid and binding against the parties thereto even without the act of registration. The registration is intended to protect the buyer against claims of third parties against subsequent alienations by the vendor, and is certainly not necessary to give effect, as between the parties, to their deed of sale. Thus, for the purpose of reckoning the five-year period to exercise the right to repurchase, the date of conveyance is construed to refer to the date of the execution of the deed transferring the ownership of the land to the buyer.[16]
In this case, Mata conveyed the ownership of the subject property to Laureta by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
The same conclusion would obtain even if the running of the five-year period were to start from 9 May 1985, when Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46346 covering the subject property was issued in favor Laureta after the sale in his favor was approved by the Minister of Natural Resources in accordance with the decision in Civil Case No. 3083, petitioners’ action to repurchase the subject property would still be time-barred, as more than five (5) years had already lapsed.
Petitioners further argue that the five-year period should be reckoned from September 1990, when the decision of this Court in Laureta[18] allegedly became final and executory. Petitioners maintain that prior to the said date, they could not exercise their right to repurchase since the issue of its ownership was still then under litigation. This contention is without merit. As earlier discussed, the act of conveyance within the meaning of the Section 119 of the Public Land
Adsum
June 7, 2011
3:14pm
I. Difference between a free patent and a homestead grant
In Republic vs. CA, 352 SCRA 148, March 9, 2001, the Supreme Court held that:
“Homestead Patent and Free Patent are modes of acquiring public land from the Government under C.A. No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
A Homestead is one issued to any citizen of this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of the family, who is not the owner of more than 24 hectares of land since the occupation of the Philippines by the United States
On the other hand, a Free Patent may be issued where the applicant is an natural born citizen of the Philippines, not the owner of more than 12 hectares of land; that he has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or his predecessors-in-interest, a tract of agricultural public land subject to disposition for at least 39 years prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6940, or that he has paid the real taxes thereon while the same is not occupied by other person.”
II. Free Patent or Homestead
En Banc
G.R. Nos. L-5984 and L-5985 January 28, 1954
FRANCISCO SEGOVIA, petitioner,
vs.
PRISCILLA GARCIA, ROSARIO GARCIA, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents;
FRANCISCO SEGOVIA, petitioner,
vs.
SIMPLICIA VILLAPANDO and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
“The provisions which may have bearing on the question now under consideration are sections 116 and 117 of Act 2874, both in force at the time of the issuance of the homestead patents of the parcels of land subject of the action, which are as follows:
SEC. 116. — Lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to .the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
SEC. 117. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, for a period of five years from the date of conveyance.
Section 116 of Act 2874 became Section 118 of Common wealth Act No. 141, promulgated on November 7, 1936, and was amended on June 8, 1939 by Commonwealth Act No. 456 by the addition of the following paragraph:
No alienation, transfer or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.
Section 117 of Act 2874 has become Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
The first question raised in these appeals concerns the meaning of the term "applicant" used in section 117 of Act 2874, or Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No 141. Claim is said that term means one who has applied for a homestead or a free patent, but who has not yet been granted a patent. The argument that had the Legislature intended to extend the right to repurchase to a patentee, the word patentee would have been used in the law instead of applicant, is a plausible one. Were we to accept it, however, section 117 of Act 2874 would become dead letter, as it would have no possible application at all. Under the preceding section (Sec. 116 of Act No. 2874) no conveyance can be made "from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant." Hence, a mere applicant, without patent, may not sell the land applied for before the patent is issued. How can he (applicant), therefore, repurchase a property he may not sell? Clearly, the term "applicant" can mean no other person than a patentee, because only a patentee has the right to make a conveyance and only a vendor can have the right to make a repurchase. This conclusion is reinforced by the use of the clause "when proper" in said section 117, under which conveyance is proper only after, not before, the expiration of five years from the issuance of the patent. The additional argument that the law has no reason to protect a patentee, as it has the interest of a mere applicant without a patent, has long ago been rejected by us in the case of Abendaño vs. Hao Su Ton, 47 Off. Gaz., 6359, where we said:
The contention that under the terms of section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141, a patentee or grantee of homestead land has no right to repurchase, because such right is granted only to the "applicant", is untenable because the section clearly speaks of "conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead," 'and it is obvious that before issuance of the patent (or at least before final proof), the applicant has not acquired the land. The term "applicant" in the section involved is evidently descriptive and purports to identify the one in whose name .the patent was issued. The plain intent of the law is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State has granted him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it; and this purpose would be defeated by the construction proposed by the applicant. (Pascua vs. Talens, 80 Phil., 792.)
In consonance with the above, we decide and hold that the term "applicant" as used in Section 117 of Act 2874, now Section 119 of the Public Land Law, Commonwealth Act No. 141, should be interpreted to mean the holder of a patent, whether a homestead patent or a free patent.
III. Right to repurchase is not limited to the applicant/grantee alone but extends to his legal heirs
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23245 July 31, 1968
JUANITA RIVERA, petitioner, vs. SILVINO CURAMEN, respondent.
Under the law, every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions of existing laws shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs, within five years from the date of the conveyance. Assuming that the original grantees, Silvino Curamen and his widow, had lost their right to repurchase the properties — in the case of the first because of the sale of his right to repurchase made on April 1, 1955, and in that of the second because of the quit-claim already referred to — it does not necessarily follow that their legal heirs had likewise lost their right to repurchase that they would be entitled to repurchase only their share as heirs of their deceased father who died after instituting the present case for reconveyance. The law clearly grants them the right to repurchase the property covered by a free patent or a homestead title within five years from the date of the conveyance. Speaking specifically of the present case, that right is not limited to the repurchase of the share corresponding to their father only, because the latter is already dead, but refers to the repurchase of the property — meaning the whole of it. This, in our opinion, is the only logical meaning to be given to the law which — because its purpose is to enable the family of the applicant or grantee to keep their homestead (Lustado vs. Pinol, et al., G.R. L-10825, September 27, 1957) — must be liberally construed in order to carry out that purpose.
The quit-claim executed by Dominga Barcelona can not have the effect of depriving her children of their right to repurchase. Assuming that it is valid, it binds her alone.
DBP vs. Gagarani, G.R. No. 172248, September 17, 2008
The plain intent of Sec. 119 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve and keep in the family the land that the State has gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in cleaning, developing and cultivating it.[17] Hence, the fact that the land had been inherited by the patentees’ son (and a new title in his name issued) does not bring it outside the purview of Sec. 119. In fact, the policy behind the law is fulfilled because the land remains in the family of the patentee. As we explained in Ferrer v. Mangente:[18]
The applicant for a homestead is to be given all the inducement that the law offers and is entitled to its full protection. Its blessings, however, do not stop with him. This is particularly so in this case as the appellee is the son of the deceased. There is no question then as to his status of being a legal heir. The policy of the law is not difficult to understand. The incentive for a pioneer to venture into developing virgin land becomes more attractive if he is assured that his effort will not go for naught should perchance his life be cut short. This is merely a recognition of how closely bound parents and children are in a Filipino family. Logic, the sense of fitness and of right, as well as pragmatic considerations thus call for continued adherence to the policy that not the individual applicant alone but those so closely related to him as are entitled to legal succession may take full advantage of the benefits the law confers.[19]
Having ruled that Sec. 119 is applicable to this case, we now go to the next issue: are respondents the “legal heirs” contemplated in the provision?
Petitioner argues that respondents are not the legal heirs of the patentees because respondents are merely their daughter-in-law and grandchildren.
The term “legal heirs” is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves a legitime for them.
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents. They should be considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.
The above interpretation of "legal heirs" as contra-distinguished from the restrictive construction given it by the lower court is more in keeping with the salutary purpose behind the enactment of Section 119 and the jurisprudence laid down on the matter. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to arrive at a more liberal conclusion if the section is analyzed in accordance with its purpose xxxx[22]
Respondents inherited the property from Asok, their husband and father, who in turn inherited it from his parents. Respondent Ella Gagarani Asok, as daughter-in-law of the patentees, can be considered as among the legal heirs who can repurchase the land in accordance with Salenillas v. CA.[23] In that case, we allowed the daughter and son-in-law of the patentees to repurchase the property because this would be “more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.”[24] Furthermore, the law must be liberally construed in order to carry out its purpose.[25]
IV. Conveyance contemplated must be to third persons (not family members)
EDUARDO FONTANILLA, SR. and ELLEN M. T. FONTANILLA, petitioners, vs. HON COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS DUAMAN, respondents
Echoing the ratiocination of the lower court, petitioners also aver that assuming arguendo that private respondent can still exercise his right to repurchase under Section 119, the same is already time-barred. In support of this averment, petitioners reckon the five-year period to repurchase from 21 July 1976 when private respondent conveyed the subject lot to his sons. When the complaint was filed with the lower court on 20 June 1989, more than five (5) years had lapsed and prescription of the right to repurchase had allegedly already set in.
This contention is likewise untenable. As correctly held by the CA, the transfer of the subject lot by the father (private respondent Luis) to his sons (Ernesto and Elpidio) is not the "conveyance" contemplated by Section 119 because the subject lot remains in the family of the homesteaders, the transferee being their direct descendants. The avowed fundamental policy of Section 119, e.g., "to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public land which the State had gratuitously given to him,"[6] is clearly not violated by said conveyance.
Thus, in Lasud vs. Lasud,[7] we declared that the sale by the daughter of the homesteader of her one-half share in the homestead to her brother (son of the homesteaders) "does not fall within the purpose, spirit and meaning of the provision of the Public Land Act (Com. Act No. 141, Section 119) authorizing redemption of the homestead from any vendee thereof."[8] We quoted with approval the disquisition of the lower court in this case as follows:
"x x x Considering that Sec. 119 of the Public land Law aims to preserve in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public domain which the State had gratuitously given to him, it is apparent that the conveyance mentioned therein refers to an alienation made to a third person outside the family circle. And certainly the defendant Santay Lasud can not be considered a third person in relation to the original homesteader, his father, because there is a privity of interest between him and his father, the defendant Santay Lasud being the continuity of the legal personality of the former. So much so, that the sale made by the plaintiff, Sigbe Lasud, to her brother, the defendant Santay Lasud, can not be a 'proper' case to be brought under the operations of Sec. 119 of the Public Land Law, because such a sale does not take the land out of the family circle of the homesteader their father that is, the sale is not in contravention of an avowed fundamental policy, which is, to preserve and keep [in] the family of the homesteader,' the land granted to him by the State."[9]
Since the transfer of the subject lot by private respondent to his sons does not fall within the purview of Section 119, it necessarily follows that the five-year period to repurchase cannot be reckoned from the date of said conveyance. Rather, the date of conveyance for the purpose of counting the five-year period to repurchase under Section 119 is that "alienation made to a third party outside of the family circle"[10] which in this case was the conveyance of the subject lot to petitioners on 8 August 1985. Accordingly, private respondent's complaint for the repurchase of the subject lot, which was filed on 20 June 1989, was not time-barred as not more than five (5) years had lapsed since the date of its conveyance to petitioners.
V. Failure of the patentee-vendor to secure the approval of the Secretary of DENR does not ipso facto make the sale void
Bajenting vs. Banes, G.R. No. 166190, September 20, 2006
OCT No. P-5677 was issued to and in the name of Venancio Bajenting over the property on February 6, 1976. The 25-year period provided in Section 118 of the law was to expire on February 6, 2001. However, in May 1999, Felisa Bajenting and her children sold the property to respondents without the approval of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (formerly the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources). There is no showing in the records that the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources had approved the sale.
The failure of the vendors to secure the approval of the Secretary of the DENR does not, ipso facto, make the sale void. The approval may be secured later, producing the effect of ratifying and adopting the transaction as if the sale had been previously authorized. The approval of the sale subsequent thereto would have the effect of the Secretary’s ratification and adoption as if the sale had been previously authorized.[47] The Secretary may disapprove the sale on legal grounds.
VI. Right to repurchase if sold in public sale
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES TIMOTEO and SELFIDA S. PIÑEDA, respondents.
Section 119 does not contain any prohibition to convey homestead land but grants the homesteader, his widow or legal heirs a right to repurchase said land within a period of five years in the event that he conveys said land. This is in consonance with the policy of homestead laws to distribute disposable agricultural lands of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation.[29] The right to repurchase under Section 119 aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given him.[30] Such right is based on the assumption that the person under obligation to reconvey the property has the full title to the property because it was voluntarily conveyed to him or that he consolidated his title thereto by reason of a redemptioner’s failure to exercise his right of redemption.[31] It is also settled that “the five-year period of redemption fixed in Section 119 of the Public Land Law of homestead sold at extrajudicial foreclosure begins to run from the day after the expiration of the one-year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure”.[32] Thus DBP’s consolidation of title did not derogate from or impair the right of the PIÑEDAS to redeem the same under C.A.
DBP vs. Gagarani, G.R. No. 172248, September 17, 2008
This is far from a novel issue. It was already resolved in Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. CA:[26]
Thus, the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of land acquired under free patent or homestead statutes may be summarized as follows: xxx If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption period also pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act.[27]
There is no dispute that in extrajudicial foreclosures under Act 3135, the debtor or his or her successors-in-interest may redeem the property within one year. This redemption period should be reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale.[28] The five-year period fixed in Sec. 119 begins to run from the expiration of the one-year redemption period.[29] Here, the certificate of sale was registered on December 24, 1992 and the one-year redemption period expired on December 24, 1993. Reckoned from that day, respondents had a five-year period, or until December 24, 1998, to exercise their right to repurchase under Sec. 119 of CA 141. Consequently, the CA was correct in holding that the complaint filed on May 15, 1998 was on time.
VII. Conveyance: meaning
Under the case of CODIDI MATA, CELESTINO, LUCIA, INGRACIO, PIO, MARCELO, MELETON, RICARDA, PAGAKAN, and CARING, all surnamed MATA, and duly represented by their attorney-in-fact ISIDRO SEMBRANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF CLARO L. LAURETA,respondents, [G.R. No. 103476. November 18, 1999], the Supreme Court had the occasion to define the term conveyance in relation to Section 119, CA 141 (now Section 119, PD 1529):
The next issue is whether or not petitioners can still validly exercise their right to repurchase the subject property pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land
"Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five (5) years from date of conveyance,"
The term "conveyance" imports the transfer of legal title from one person to another. It usually takes place upon the execution of the deed purporting to transfer the ownership of the land as the same is already valid and binding against the parties thereto even without the act of registration. The registration is intended to protect the buyer against claims of third parties against subsequent alienations by the vendor, and is certainly not necessary to give effect, as between the parties, to their deed of sale. Thus, for the purpose of reckoning the five-year period to exercise the right to repurchase, the date of conveyance is construed to refer to the date of the execution of the deed transferring the ownership of the land to the buyer.[16]
In this case, Mata conveyed the ownership of the subject property to Laureta by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
The same conclusion would obtain even if the running of the five-year period were to start from 9 May 1985, when Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46346 covering the subject property was issued in favor Laureta after the sale in his favor was approved by the Minister of Natural Resources in accordance with the decision in Civil Case No. 3083, petitioners’ action to repurchase the subject property would still be time-barred, as more than five (5) years had already lapsed.
Petitioners further argue that the five-year period should be reckoned from September 1990, when the decision of this Court in Laureta[18] allegedly became final and executory. Petitioners maintain that prior to the said date, they could not exercise their right to repurchase since the issue of its ownership was still then under litigation. This contention is without merit. As earlier discussed, the act of conveyance within the meaning of the Section 119 of the Public Land
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